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CANADA/EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT SIGNED
An agreementrin the form of an exchange of letters, was signed in
Brussels on 16 January 7978 by the EC Commissioner responsible for energy,
Dr. Guido Brunner, and by the Charg6 drAffaires of the Mission of Canada
to the European Communities, Mr. P. David Lee. The safeguards agreement
which has been negotiated is an updating of the existing agreement between
the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community for
co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which was signed on
6 October 1959.
The principal features of the amended agreement are as follows:
This undertaking and other provisions of the agreement will be verified
in Canada by the lnternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in the
Community by Eurat.om (European Atomic Energy Community) and the IAEA
in accordance with the agreements concluded between Euratom, its member
states and the IAEA.
IAEA verification will cover:
a) al1 nuclear facilities and equipment transferred under
for the life of these facilities and equipment, and
b) all nuclear material (uranium, thorium, plutonium and
supplied and future generations of this material.
4. Internationally recognized leve1s of physical protection will be applied
as minima to ensure against diversion of nuclear material.
Provisions for fallback safeguards agreed upon by the two parties in
case IAEA/Euratom safeguards are not being applied.
The Conrnunity recognized that Canada requires specific assurances prior
to the transfer of Canadian nuclear technology. The Cornrnunity and Canada
have agreed that transfers of sensitive nuclear technology, including
Candu technotogy, would be covered by agreements to be concluded between
individual member states of the Community and the Government of Canada.
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7. Control over transfers of nuclear material and equipment is already provided
for in the 1959 agreement.
8. Assurances are provided that no Canadian material will be used in French
reactors until safeguards administered by Euratom and verified by the IAEA
are in place. Assurances are also provided that any plutonium derived from
Canadian source material would be used only in the French civil nuclear
programme.
9. An interim arrangement is being entered into to govern enrichment beyond
20%, reprocessing and subsequent storage of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium.
Canada and the Community have agreed Eo cooperate, both bilaterally and
internationally, to identify arrangements to ensure that every precaution
is taken with respect to the generation and dissemination of material
that can be used for nuclear weapons. They recognize, as well, the need
to meet legitimate energy requirements. In view of the participation of
Canada and of the Cornmunity and its member states in the International
Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which will examine reprocessing, enrichment
and storage, the parties have agreed on an interim arrangement covering
those operations as they apply to Canadian origin material.
The Conrnunity will notify Canada prior to reprocessing, enriching or
storing any material transferred after 20 December 7974 (which is the
date on which the Canadian Government laid down its new policy require-
ments). In addition, Canada has requested, and the Community has agreed
to provide information on planned reprocessing of material transferred
before 20 December 1974. In both cases, consultations will take place
on request to ensure that adequate safeguards for the operation contempla-
ted are in place, in order that any risks of nuclear proliferation may
be avoided. The consultations will enable each party to exchange informa-
tion on the nature and Purpose of reprocessing, enrichment and storage
of Canadian origin material and in time help develop criteria that might
ensure that these operations are conducted in a manner fully compatible
with non-proliferation. A meeting will be held of the Joint Technical
Working Group of the CormnuniEy and Canada early in the new year to work
out appropriate modalities for notification and consultations.
C. Canadian supplies of uranium in the interim period will be limited
broadly to ensure the current needs of the Community.
D. The interim arrangement will last for the expected duration of the INFCE
plus one year to allow the negotiation of a more permanent arrangement
and may be renewed or extended only with the agreement of both parties.
10. Following the agreement outlined in this exchange of letters, the Canadian
Government has decided to resume shipments of uranium to the Conununity,
which had been suspended since January 1977.
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